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For decades, the Chilean economy was characterized by  a lukewarm perfor- 
mance. Growth was modest, inflation was among the highest in the world, and 
the degree of social conflict was high. Already in the nineteenth century inter- 
national  observers argued that, despite its natural beauty, the country’s econ- 
omy was unexciting. Some even blamed  this  state of affairs on the lack of 
creativity  and work ethics in Chileans. This view  was vividly  expressed in 
1885 by H. W.  Bates, the assistant secretary of the Royal Geographic Society, 
when he argued that the typical Chilean was a “half breed of the Spaniard and 
Indian, and like the inhabitants of all the warmer climates, . . . love[s] best the 
dolce far niente” (p. 379). 
Throughout most of the twentieth century the role of the state grew relent- 
lessly in Chile. Regulations were piled on top of regulations, and state-owned 
enterprises became increasingly important. This heightened government inter- 
vention was supposed to accelerate growth and help reduce inequality. Nothing 
of the sort happened, however. In fact, during the first seven decades of  the 
twentieth century, Chile was a timid performer, experiencing one of the lowest 
rates of growth in Latin America. 
And then in the late 1980s things changed dramatically. As a result of a deep 
and  daring market-oriented  reform  program  initiated in  the  mid- 1970s, the 
country began to grow at increasingly rapid rates-between  1986 and  1995, 
the average rate of growth has bordered on 7 percent. Not only has Chile be- 
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come a star performer, but her reforms have attracted considerable attention 
around the world. More and more analysts are studying the Chilean experiment 
in order to understand how to move successfully toward a market orientation. 
Perhaps one of the most admired aspects of the Chilean program has been 
the reform of the pension system, which replaced an inefficient pay-as-you-go 
system with a privately administered defined-contribution one.’ This reform 
has been credited with helping develop Chile’s capital market, with reducing 
government contingent liabilities, and with helping boost Chile’s traditionally 
anemic saving rate. A large number of pension reforms around the world are 
now being tailored after Chile’s pioneering program. For example, by the mid- 
1990s, six other Latin American countries had followed Chile’s lead and had 
reformed (to different degrees) their social security systems. More important, 
perhaps,  enough  time  has  elapsed  since  implementation  of  the  reforms, 
allowing for an evaluation of the program. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the most salient aspects of the Chil- 
ean program and to evaluate its achievements to date. The paper is organized as 
follows: Section 1.1 provides a brief background of the Chilean reform effort. 
Section 1.2 deals with Chile’s old pay-as-you-go system, including its degree 
of  (in)efficiency, its distributive characteristics,  and its fiscal consequences. 
Section 1.3 is the core of the paper; it deals with the reforms per se, focusing 
on the functioning of the system. Section 1.4 concentrates on the system’s re- 
sults to date. Section 1.5 discusses transitional issues, including the fiscal con- 
sequences of the reforms. Section 1.6 deals with the effects of the reforms on 
labor markets and saving. Finally, section 1.6 contains concluding remarks. 
1.1  The Chilean Market-Oriented Reforms: A Brief and 
Selective Overview 
The  Chilean market-oriented  structural  reform program  was  initiated  in 
1975, ten years prior to the launching of the rest of the Latin American reforms. 
The program was based on three basic policy measures: (a)  a drastic opening 
of the economy; (b)  an ambitious privatization and deregulation program; and 
(c)  a stabilization based on a predetermined  nominal exchange rate anchor, 
supported by (largely) restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. Table 1.1 con- 
tains a summary of  the policies undertaken during the first ten years of  the 
Chilean reforms.2 
Chile opened up its economy to international competition in the mid- 1970s. 
After decades of protectionism, import licenses were fully abolished, and im- 
port tariffs were reduced from an average that exceeded 100 percent to a uni- 
I. As I point out in  sec.  1.1,  as is the case with most Latin American systems, the Chilean 
system was not created as a pay-as-you-go system. Originally, the accumulation of reserve funds 
was  contemplated.  In  reality, however, it  quickly  became  a  de facto pay-as-you-go  system. 
Throughout the paper, thus, I will refer to it as such. 
2. On the Chilean reforms, see Harberger (1985), Edwards and Edwards (1991). and Bosworth, 
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Table 1.1  Chile’s Structural Reforms: An Overview 
Item  Description 
Trade liberalization  Major unilateral opening during 1975-79. All quantitative restrictions 
eliminated; uniform import tariff of  10% established. Temporary 
hike in tariffs in mid- 1980s; since 1987, uniform import tariff 
of  11%. 
Privatization 
Fiscal reform 
’Rvo rounds of privatization: 1974-79  and 1984-89.  During first round, 
banks were privatized first, followed by manufacturing firms. First 
round ended in crisis in 1982, with a number of major banks being 
nationalized. During second round, efforts made to establish 
regulatory framework before firms and banks were sold. By  1994, 
approximately 96% of state-owned enterprises had been privatized. 
Some major firms, including the giant copper producer CODELCO, 
remain under government control. 
Major tax reform in  1975. Value-added tax introduced. Personal and 
corporate income taxes consolidated. Significant improvement in 
administrative capacity. Fiscal accounts balanced since 1977. Tax 
rates revised in mid-1980s in order to encourage saving. 
Financial reform  Sweeping reform was begun in 1975 with privatization of banks. 
Interest rate controls and forced credit allocation were eliminated. 
Reserve requirements were drastically reduced, and entry into 
banking sector was encouraged. Securities markets received a major 
boost as a result of social security reform. Supervisory framework 
weak until mid-1980s; significantly strengthened since then. 
Social security  Insolvent pay-as-you-go system replaced by individually capitalized 
system run by private administrators. Health system transformed into 
a two-tier system: a basic one for lower-income people and an 
insurance-based system for most workers. 
form 10 percent level. As a result of Chile’s integration with the rest of  the 
world, local firms were forced to increase their degree of productivity. By the 
early 1990s, Chile’s exports were booming and had clearly become the coun- 
try’s engine of growth. 
Between 1974 and 1992, the Chilean government privatized more than five 
hundred firms. This process was carried out in two rounds-the  first during 
the mid- and late 1970s and the second during the mid- and late 1980s. These 
two efforts were separated by a brief interlude, between 1982 and 1984, when 
there was a partial reversal in the process and the government had to take over 
more than fifty banks and firms. 
The first round of privatization (1974-82)  had two distinct components. The 
first was the return of firms seized by the Unidad Popular during 1970-73  to 
their original  stockholder^.^ The second consisted of the sale of a large number 
3.  These firms had not been nationalized. The Allende administration used an obscure piece of 
legislation from the  1930s to “intervene” in the business of companies whose products were in 
“short supply.” For details, see Edwards and Edwards (1991). See also Larrain and Meller (1991). 36  Sebastian Edwards 
of banks and firms to the private sector. Some of  these companies had been 
nationalized during the Allende administration, while others had traditionally 
been under government control. In an effort to sell large number of companies 
fast, the government made no effort to restructure them before offering them 
to the public. Many of these firms were in serious financial difficulties, and all 
of them had major productivity problems.  It was expected that buyers would 
implement the necessary steps to improve efficiency. To that effect, the govern- 
ment placed  very few restrictions on the buyers’ ability to lay off redundant 
workers. 
During the second round of  privatization,  started in  1985, the authorities’ 
main objectives were to reduce very significantly the size of the government 
and to spread ownership. The first step in this second round consisted of repri- 
vatizing  those firms that had failed during the financial crisis of  1982. This 
time, however, the government  did not provide credit and carefully checked 
the financial credentials of prospective buyers. Financial institutions (including 
two of the largest banks) were privatized through a scheme known as “popular 
capitalism,”  under which  private  individuals  were  allowed  to buy  a limited 
amount of shares-up  to U.S.$7,000 at a discounted value.4 
In the late  1980s, the Chilean government greatly broadened the scope of 
privatization by selling large public utilities and firms that had always been in 
government  hands, including the largest steel mill, the  national airline, and 
most utilities-telephones,  electricity, water. During this phase, the govern- 
ment exercised great pragmatism, combining different modes of privatization 
even for a given firm. Shares were sold-usually  at a discount-to  workers, to 
foreigners, to local private companies, and to the newly created pension funds. 
During  the  second phase  of  privatization,  the Chilean  government  intro- 
duced sweeping regulatory reforms. Particularly  important were the laws es- 
tablishing operating and servicing rules for utilities. The main principle behind 
this new set of regulations was that entry and price setting would be left to the 
market in those areas with a high degree of competition or contestability. The 
government  would  regulate  technical  aspects-including  those  related  to 
safety-and  price setting in areas where markets were imperfect. 
In an effort to shield the real sector from the effects of inflation, in the 1970s 
the Chilean authorities developed a comprehensive indexation program for the 
financial sector. At the heart of this mechanism was the creation of  a unit of 
account called unidad de  foment0 (UF), whose value changes daily according 
to (one-month) lagged inflation. Starting in the mid-1980s (and until the time 
of  this writing), virtually  every financial contract exceeding ninety days has 
been expressed in terms of UFs. As a result of  this, interest rates on longer- 
term securities are generally expressed (and negotiated) in real terms in an ex 
ante fashion. This, as will be seen below, has added an important component 
of predictability  to Chile’s capital market and to the privately managed pen- 
sions system. 
4. For details, see Luders (1991). 37  The Chilean Pension Reform: A Pioneering Program 
Many observers forecasted that the new Chilean democratic government that 
took over in 1990 would put an end to the divestiture process and would even 
repeal some of the privatizations of the military regime. However, nothing of 
this kind happened. In fact, after some heated debate on the subject, the govern- 
ment of President Aylwin decided to continue the privatization process (see El 
mercurio [international edition], 7-14  January 1993). 
By  the mid- 1990s, Chile’s market-oriented  reforms had become consoli- 
dated, as the leaders of virtually every political party agreed with the merits of 
the new system. The country was growing at a rapid and steady rate, unemploy- 
ment was around 5 percent, and poverty was in retreat. Foreign observers, mar- 
veling at the country’s transformation, continued to analyze the sources of this 
success story. More often than not, they pointed to the pension reform as one 
of the central elements of the Chilean mira~le.~ 
1.2  Chile’s Traditional Pay-as-You-Go  Pension System 
As was the case with most Latin American countries, Chile adopted a social 
security system in the 1920s. The original system was not, as it has often been 
argued, a pure pay-as-you-go one. During its early years, when contributions 
made by active workers exceeded pension payments, it was based on the col- 
lective capitalization of funds. As the system became more mature, it was ex- 
pected that increasing obligations would be met both by drawing on these 
funds and by  increasing  active workers’ contributions. Accumulated  funds, 
however, were poorly managed, and benefits-especially  for the more well- 
to-do-escalated  quickly. As a result, the system ran into serious financial dif- 
ficulties and, increasingly, relied on the government to meet its obligations. For 
all practical purposes, and in spite of the original intentions of its founders, by 
the 1970s the system had become an insolvent pay-as-you-go regime. 
One of the most important characteristics of the old system was its lack of 
uniformity. There were more than one hundred different retirement regimes. 
While some workers could retire with a very high pension at forty-two years 
of age, blue-collar workers could retire only once they turned sixty-five, and 
yet others could retire at fifty-five with a full pension. Some pensions were not 
subject to an automatic cost-of-living adjustment. Senior bureaucrats, however, 
got a 100 percent-plus-inflation  adjustment, as they maintained, through life, 
a pension equal to the salary paid to an active worker in a position similar to the 
last one they held. After fifty years of operation, and contrary to its architects’ 
intentions,  the  system  had  become  increasingly  unfair.  While  upper-  and 
middle-class workers were able to reap substantial benefits, poorer workers 
continued to face tough  requirements  to obtain a pension  that  was  largely 
eroded by  inflation. As a consequence of inflation and mismanagement, be- 
tween  1962 and  1980 the average pension paid to a blue-collar worker had 
declined by 41 percent. 
5. See, e.g., the Americas column in the 28 June 1996 issue of the Wall Srreer Journal. 38  Sebastian Edwards 
Chile’s traditional retirement system was characterized by very high contri- 
bution rates. In 1973, for example, total contributions-by  employers and em- 
ployees-vaned  between  16 and 26 percent of wages, depending on the type 
of job the individual held. By 1980, total contributions had been reduced to an 
average of  19 percent of  (taxable) wages.h What made things worse was that 
there was almost no connection  between retirement contributions and (per- 
ceived) benefits. In that regard, then, these contributions were largely seen as 
taxes on labor and contributed  significantly to the poor performance  of  the 
country’s labor market during the 1960s and 1970s (Cox-Edwards 1992). 
Demographic trends worked steadily against Chile’s traditional retirement 
system. While in 1955 there were twelve active contributors per retiree, this 
figure had declined to 2.5 by  1979. As a result of this and of highly inefficient 
management, the Chilean system became increasingly unfunded. By the early 
1970s, the system as a whole  was  already running  a dramatic deficit. The 
gap between revenues and outlays-administrative  costs plus pensions-was 
made up by the public sector. By 1971, the central government’s contributions 
to the system were already 4 percent of  GDP, and the present valued of  the 
system’s contingent liabilities exceeded 100 percent of GDP.’ 
In 1981, the military government decided to introduce a sweeping reform of 
the retirement system. The decision to undertake the reform responded to four 
considerations: (a)  the explosive fiscal consequences of the old regime; (b)  the 
high degree of inequality of  the old system; (c) its implied efficiency distor- 
tions; and (d) an ideological desire to reduce drastically the role of the public 
sector in economic affairs. Interestingly enough, in explaining the reform, the 
Chilean authorities barely referred to the (potential) effects of the new system 
on domestic savings8 
1.3  The Chilean Social Security Reform 
On 4 November 1980, Chile’s military government approved decrees 3,500 
and 3,501, which drastically reformed the country’s social security ~ystem.~  In 
a speech delivered on 6 November  1980, Minister of Labor Jost Piiiera ex- 
plained that the goal of the reform was to create a retirement system based on 
6. There has been some confusion as to the actual level of contributions in the old system. The 
reason for this is that these rates have traditionally been  quoted as a social security aggregate, 
covering pensions, health, and disability. Total contributions were 54.4 percent in  1973 and were 
reduced to 37.6 percent in  1980 (Larrain A. 1995). The rates quoted above refer to pensions only. 
7.  For an analysis of the flow deficit of the system, see Myers (1988) and Cheyre (1988). I have 
used data reported by  them and by  Larrain A. (1995) to calculate the magnitude of the present 
value of  the system’s unfunded liabilities. 
8. The father of the reform, then minister of labor Jost Pifiera, has provided a fascinating ac- 
count of the political economy of the reform (see Pifiera 1991). 
9.  Paradoxically, 4 November 1980 was the tenth anniversary of President Salvador Allende’s 
inauguration. President Allende had also promised to reform the country’s social security system. 
His program, of course, was radically different from that of the military and called for an even 
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“freedom, and solidarity; a fair and yet efficient retirement system; a retirement 
system for everyone.” He went on to say that the reform was a “transcendental 
step that would benefit every Chilean, within the spirit of  freedom, progress 
and justice” (Piiiera 1988, 3 18). 
From a political point of  view, the launching of the reforms faced  some 
difficulties.  First,  many  interest  groups-including  public-sector  workers, 
teachers, and workers in the health sector-firmly  opposed any changes. Rep- 
resentatives of these groups realized early on that their best option was to line 
up the support of high-ranking military officers. They were partially success- 
ful, as for many months some key members of the (ruling) armed forces op- 
posed  the  project.  Second, the notion of  a collectively  funded,  “solidarity- 
based”  retirement system was deeply ingrained among intellectuals and the 
public. JosC  Piiiera, the father of  the reforms, has pointed out that, owing to 
stiff  opposition, the implementation  of the reform  had  to be postponed for 
almost a full year. It was only in  1980 that Piiiera and his team were able to 
persuade a reluctant General Pinochet of the merits of the project. The general 
himself,  however,  was  not  fully  successful  in  convincing  his  military  col- 
leagues. The armed forces did not join the new system-an  option not avail- 
able to any other group in the country. As a way to increase the appeal of the 
new system and reduce political opposition, the architects of  the plan deter- 
mined the new contribution rates so as to increase net take-home pay for those 
joining the  new  system. On average, those who transferred to the privately 
run capitalization system experienced an  11 percent increase in after-tax pay 
(Iglesias and Vittas 1992). This increase in take-home earnings was engineered 
largely as a way of making the reforms popular and generating an incentive to 
encourage workers to shift voluntarily to the new system. At the same time, it 
was expected that, given the anticipated higher rates of return on the accumu- 
lated funds, the lower contributions would be enough to finance higher rates 
of replacement for pensions. 
Despite some political difficulties, there is no doubt that, given the dictato- 
rial nature of the Chilean government of the time, the authorities faced a sig- 
nificantly lower degree of political opposition than they would have encoun- 
tered in a democratic regime. Some authors have, in fact, argued that, owing 
to the political considerations in most Latin American countries, it is not feasi- 
ble to implement a Chilean-type reform (Mesa-Lago 1996). 
1.3.1  Fundamental Aspects of the Reform 
The reform of Chile’s social security system replaced  a basically  insolvent 
pay-as-you-go regime with a capitalization system based on individual retire- 
ment accounts managed by private companies known as udministrudorus de 
fondos depensiones (AFPs).’” Each AFP can manage only one retirement fund, 
10. In the reformed system, the state plays a fundamental role regulating and monitoring the 
operation of the management companies and guaranteeing “solidarity in the base” through a mini- 40  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 1.2  Chile: Key Legal Requirements for AFPs 
Initiating operations  a)  Authorization by the Superintendency of AFPs 
b)  Minimum capital requirement: UF5,000 (approx. U.S.$160,000) 
Mandates  a)  Manage one pension fund 
b)  Provide and administer only the benefits permitted by law 
Minimum capital and  a)  Minimum capital requirements grow with the number of 
affiliates: UF10,OOO for 5,000-7,499  affiliates, UF15,000 for 
7,500-9,000  affiliates, and UF20,OOO for 10,000 or more 
affiliates 
reserve requirements 
b)  Reserve requirement:  1% of  value of pension fund 
c) Minimum revenue rate: (1) the average, annual real revenue rate 
of all pension funds minus 2 percentage points, or (whichever is 
less); (2) 50% of the average, annual real revenue rate 
Permitted investments  a)  In firm’s shares (stocks): (I) permitted in 1985, up to 5% of 
pension fund assets or of a firm’s total shares, whichever was 
less; (2) since 1989, limit expanded to up to 7% of pension fund 
assets and maximum ownership of  1% of a firm’s shares 
issued in mid-1992; (2) permitted to invest a small percentage of 
total assets in low-risk, fixed-return instruments issued by 
foreign banks or governments 
b)  In foreign instrument: (1) permitted since 1990, but guidelines 
and there is a strict separation between the retirement fund and the manage- 
ment firm’s assets. This one-fund-per-AFP rule, in conjunction with a regula- 
tion that establishes a minimum rate of  return on the funds, has resulted in a 
low degree of  actual portfolio diversification across AFPs. 
Workers have the freedom to choose the AFP with which they want to be 
affiliated and can transfer their funds freely among AFPs. When they retire, 
they can choose to buy an annuity or to withdraw their funds according to a 
predetermined (actuarially fair) plan.” The system also has survivors’ benefits 
(term life insurance) and a disability program funded with an additional insur- 
ance premium. A detailed and modern regulatory framework-enforced  by an 
institution especially created for this purpose, the Superintendency of AFPs- 
regulates  investment portfolios  and ensures  free determination  of  fees and 
commissions and free entry into the industry. The Superintendency  of AFPs 
established from the first day very precise norms to secure the diversification 
and transparency of AFP investments (for a list of  key legal requirements for 
operating an AFP, see table 1.2). 
Since its inception, the new Chilean retirement system has gone through a 
mum pension. An important feature of the new social security system is that it is obligatory, requir- 
ing that all non-self-employed workers make contributions equal to 10 percent of their dispos- 
able income. 
11. At this time, there are not enough (available) data to analyze the efficiency of the annuities 
market. There have been  some claims, however, that these still have a very high price, one that 
exceeds the actuarially fair price (see Vittas 1995). 41  The Chilean Pension Reform: A Pioneering Program 
number of changes. Between November  1980 and August  1995, there have 
been thirty modifications made to the original legal texts. Of the ninety-seven 
permanent articles of decree 3,500, only twelve have not been modified during 
the first fifteen years of the reforms (Sequeira 1995). In this subsection, I de- 
scribe in some detail the evolution of the system during its first fifteen years. In 
the subsections that follow, I deal with issues related to investment regulations, 
accumulated funds, and rates of return. 
Coverage and Contribution Rates 
Workers employed in the formal sector are required by law to participate in 
the retirement system. They must contribute, to the AFP  of  their choice,  10 
percent of their wages. These funds are invested by the AFP and are accumu- 
lated in an individual retirement account. Participants can switch management 
funds up to four times a year. 
There is an additional contribution of  (approximately) 3 percent of wages 
as a premium for term life and disability insurance. Both these contributions 
are subject to a maximum wage base, which is currently equivalent to approxi- 
mately U.S.$2,000  per month.12  Self-employed workers are not required to par- 
ticipate in the system. They have the choice, however, to establish retirement 
accounts that are (basically) subject to the same regulations as those of formal- 
sector employees. 
In analyzing the degree of coverage of the reformed Chilean system, it is 
important to distinguish between those workers who are afJiliated to the sys- 
tem-that  is workers who have, at one time or another, enrolled in an AFP- 
and those who are active contributors to the system. While the percentage of 
individuals affiliated to the system is very high-almost  99 percent of the labor 
force-the  percentage of  active contributors is significantly  smaller, in  1995 
standing at 58 percent of those employed. In addition, in 1994, those still af- 
fected by the old system represented 5.5 percent of total employment. The total 
coverage of the Chilean retirement system amounted, then, to 63.5 percent of 
the employed, approximately the same percentage as in the traditional system. 
The relatively low percentage of active contributors is one of the most im- 
portant weaknesses of the system and is explained by two basic factors: first, 
the self-employed are not required to participate in the system and, for a variety 
of reasons, including tax considerations, have no incentives to make voluntary 
contributions.’3 Second, the existence of a government-guaranteed (universal) 
minimum pension creates a moral hazard situation among low-income work- 
ers, many  of  whom are self-employed (for more details, see the discussion 
below). In their case, it pays to contribute only sporadically and only enough 
to obtain the minimum pension once they retire. 
12. The amount of the maximum “pensionable” salary is set in UFs, Chile’s indexed unit of 
13.  Although, as explained below, voluntary contributions are (up to a limit) tax deductible, by 
account. The limit is sixty UFs per month. In October 1996,  this was equivalent to U.S.$1,901. 
contributing to an AFP a self-employed worker is revealing information to tax authorities. 42  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 1.3  Chile: Evolution of the Pension Funds 
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Source: Bustamante Jeraldo (1995). 
"March 1995 dollars. 
Ta  Treatment and Voluntary Contributions 
In  addition  to  the  required  contributions,  employees can make voluntary 
contributions to the AFP that holds their retirement account.'4  Voluntary con- 
tributions have a limit of U.S.$2,000  per month. Required contributions  are 
tax deductible, as is the income accrued to the accumulated  fund during the 
contributor's  active life. Voluntary contributions, on the other hand, are not tax 
deductible. Income accrued to voluntarily contributed funds is, however, free 
of  taxes. Once workers retire, however, their pension becomes subject to in- 
come tax, as with any other source of income. 
Despite tax incentives and the splendid financial result of the AFPs (for de- 
tails, see below), the volume of voluntary funds has remained very small. Al- 
though by December 1994 there were more than 800,000 voluntary accounts, 
the total voluntary funds accumulated in the system amounted to only 1.4 per- 
cent of total funds (Fuentes Silva 1995). 
1.3.2  Accumulated Funds, Investment Rules, and Rates of Return 
The volume of pension funds privately managed by the AFPs has increased 
dramatically since 1981. As can be seen in table  1.3, between  1985 and 1995 
they increased from 10  to almost 43 percent of GDP. Furthermore, recent simu- 
lations suggest that, by  the year 2010, the accumulated funds will represent 
110 percent of GDP and that, by 2020, they will have reached  134 percent of 
GDP (Fuentes Silva 1995). 
From early on, the authorities tightly regulated the type of assets the funds 
14. There is no special treatment for married couples. 43  The Chilean Pension Reform: A Pioneering Program 
could invest in. This regulation has taken the form of maximum limits on hold- 
ings of a particular type of financial instrument. The rationale for these limits 
has been safety. Initially, and especially given the opposition to the reform by 
influential members of the armed forces, the economic authorities decided that 
it was essential that the funds be invested mostly in high-grade securities. Dur- 
ing the early years, funds were largely restricted to government  securities- 
with a limit of 100 percent of the fund-bank  deposits, investment-grade cor- 
porate bonds, and mortgage bonds. In  1985, AFPs were allowed to invest in 
equities. Although the limit on equities was theoretically set at 5 percent of the 
funds, strict restrictions on the type of issuing firm seriously limited the AFPs' 
ability to invest in equities. In fact, during the second half of the  1980s, most 
funds invested exclusively in equities of firms that were being privatized. As a 
result of these restrictions, by the end of  1986 the AFPs had invested in only 
six stocks, representing less than 4 percent of the total fund. 
By  1989, some of these restrictions were lifted, and most AFPs increased 
their equities positions significantly. At that time, equities from twenty-three 
firms were being held by the AFPs, adding up to 11 percent of the aggregate 
funds.  However, more than  90 percent  of  the AFPs'  equities  portfolio  was 
made up of only eight recently privatized firms. In  1989, AFPs were also al- 
lowed to invest in real estate, and, in 1992, they were permitted to invest up to 
9 percent of the fund in foreign securities. Surprisingly, perhaps, there has been 
a very limited interest in investing in foreign instruments. By December  1995, 
less than 1 percent of the accumulated funds had been invested abroad. 
As can be seen in table 1.4, rates of return on the accumulated funds have 
Table 1.4  Chile: Annual Real Rates of Return of the Pension Fund System (%0)1 
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been nothing short of spectacular. This has been largely the result of Chile’s 
economic circumstances during this period. Between 1985 and 1995,  Chile has 
experienced a period of tremendous growth, the value of assets, and in particu- 
lar firms, increasing at a very fast rate. Additionally, between  1985 and 1991, 
real interest rates were very high, allowing funds that invested in fixed-income 
securities to experience very healthy returns. A recent study of the sources of 
AFPs’ rates of return shows that the return on the stock of two electric utilities 
(Enersis and Endesa) explains almost 40 percent of the total return of the funds 
(Valck V.  and Walker H.  1995). It is highly likely that, in the years to come, 
both interest rates and stock market returns will move closer in line with inter- 
national levels, affecting the rate of return of pension  funds. In fact, during 
1995 and 1996, the AFPs have experienced, on average, a negative real return. 
The Chilean system imposes a lower limit to the return that AFPs must pay 
their members. This minimum is either 50 percent of the average return across 
AFPs or 2 percentage points below the average-whichever  is higher. Those 
AFPs that do not obtain this minimum return from their portfolio must make 
up the difference from funds withdrawn from an “investment reserve” espe- 
cially set up for this purpose. This “reserve” must amount to at least 1 percent 
of the total value of the fund and is invested in a portfolio that exactly mimics 
that of the fund. If an AFP cannot meet a profitability  shortfall out of its re- 
serves, it is liquidated. The state makes up the difference between the actual 
and the minimum guaranteed return, and contributors  transfer their funds to 
another AFP. 
There is also a maximum allowable return, determined as SO percent or 2 
percentage points over the average across AFPs. Those companies that exceed 
the  maximum have to deposit  the  excess funds in  a  “profitability reserve,” 
which is part of the fund’s (and not the management company’s) assets. If in a 
subsequent year the AFP’s portfolio underperforms, this reserve can be used to 
make up the difference between the actual and the minimum return. 
The combination  of the “one fund per AFP’ and the minimudmaximum 
profitability rules has resulted in AFPs having extremely similar portfolios. In 
fact, as table 1.4 shows, the dispersion in returns has been very small. Although 
this homogeneity of results may have some political appeal-no  group of par- 
ticipants will appear as being taken advantage of-it  introduces nontrivial eco- 
nomic distortions. In particular, and as will be discussed in greater detail below, 
it increases the administrative costs of running funds and does not allow people 
with different tolerances for risk to have different portfolios. 
1.3.3  Administrative Costs and Concentration 
A number of critics of the Chilean social security reform have argued that a 
privately run system based on free choice is exceedingly costly. In particular, 
it has been argued that a system that allows-in  fact, encourages-frequent 
transfers of funds across AFPs will tend to overspend in advertising and in 
sales. It has been proposed  that a better  solution would  be either to have a 45  The Chilean Pension Reform: A Pioneering Program 
public-sector institution manage the retirement funds or to restrict the partici- 
pants'  ability to transfer their funds across AFPs (Diamond 1994; Mesa-Lago 
1996). 
Fees and commissions are determined freely by the AFPs. Currently, they 
are allowed to charge the following fees: a proportional fee on contributions; 
a fee for opening a new account; a fee for managing programmed pension 
withdrawals; a fee for managing voluntary contributions; and a flat fee per 
period when contributions are made. In recent years, however, most AFPs have 
waived the flat fee (Vittas 1995). In addition to these fees, AFPs were allowed, 
until 1987, to charge a management fee on every account, including those of 
inactive workers. On the other hand, and in order to encourage competition, 
AFPs are not allowed to charge an exit fee. 
Initially, administrative costs were extremely high. In  1984, for example, 
they amounted to 9 percent of  wages, or 90 percent of contributions  to the 
retirement  system!  By  1994,  however,  costs  had  declined  significantly, 
amounting to  1 percent of wages or  10 percent of contributions. In spite of 
these high costs, the new capitalization system is significantly more efficient 
than the old pay-as-you-go regime. For example, Bustos (1995) has calculated 
that the total costs of the new regime are 42 percent lower than the average 
costs of the old system. 
In terms of accumulated assets, administrative costs have declined from al- 
most 15 percent in 1983 to 1.8 percent in 1993, including sales costs.1S  In spite 
of these relatively high administrative costs, the net return to participants for 
the system as a whole exceeded 10  percent in real terms during the first fifteen 
years of the system. Vittas (1995) has argued that, although Chilean adminis- 
trative costs as a percentage of assets are not very different from those of U.S. 
and U.K. insurance companies, they are significantly higher than the costs in- 
curred by government-run provident funds in Singapore and Malaysia-O.1- 
0.2 percent of accumulated assets. 
Marketing and sales costs represent an important percentage of total admin- 
istrative costs. ValdCs-Prieto (1994), for example, has estimated that, in 1991, 
marketing and sales costs exceeded one-third of total costs. Margozzini Cahis 
(1995), on the other hand, has calculated that sales costs averaged 20 percent 
of total costs, with marketing costs representing an additional 3 percent. More- 
over, there is evidence that, in the last few years, these costs have increased 
significantly. The total sales force for the system, for example, has increased 
from thirty-five hundred in 1990 to almost fifteen thousand in early 1995. All 
in all, sales costs as a percentage of total costs have more than doubled between 
1988 and 1995. 
Some critics of the Chilean reform have argued that limiting the frequency 
with which participants can switch funds provides an efficient way of reducing 
administrative costs and thus increasing the net return that accrues to contribu- 
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tors. However, since the cost of opening a new account represents a high per- 
centage of the cost of transferring funds, a more effective solution-and  one 
that would maintain individual’s choice-would  be to allow AFPs to manage 
more  than one retirement  fund. In  this  way,  individuals could transfer their 
retirement savings to different funds, within the same AFP, at a reduced cost. 
Moreover, the elimination-or,  at least, modification-of  the minimum return 
requirement would increase the degree of competition among AFPs and would 
allow individuals with different attitudes towards risk to choose the type of 
fund that better suits their preferences. 
When the new retirement system was launched in  1981, there were twelve 
pension  management  firms.  By  1995,  the  total  number  had  increased  to 
twenty-one AFPs. In spite of relatively free entry, the industry has a nontrivial 
degree of concentration. In  1990-94,  for example, 68 percent of all workers 
were affiliated to the three largest AFPs. The degree of concentration has de- 
clined considerably, however. According to a World Bank study, the Herfindahl 
concentration index fell from 2,200 in 1981 to 1,260 in 1994 (Vittas 1995). 
During  the first fifteen years  of  operation of  the new  system, AFPs  have 
been, on average, highly profitable. Their average (real) return on equity has 
averaged  16.6 percent  over a decade and a half, peaking in  1989-91,  when 
it exceeded 35 percent per year. This high return, however, hides significant 
differences  across AFPs. For example, in  1994, eleven of twenty-one AFPs 
incurred losses that in some cases bordered 50 percent of equity (see Margoz- 
zini Cahis 1995; and Vittas 1995). 
1.3.4  Government Guarantees 
Although the Chilean system is based on individually capitalized accounts 
managed by private firms, the government retains an important role that goes 
well beyond regulating and supervising the system. First, the government guar- 
antees a minimum pension to poorer participants in the system. Those individ- 
uals who have contributed to the system for at least twenty years, and whose 
accumulated funds cannot cover a minimum pension, receive from the state a 
transfer that raises their pension to that minimum. 
The value of the minimum pension  is adjusted by inflation every time the 
accumulated  change in the CPI reaches  15 percent. This means that, at the 
current level of inflation, minimum pensions get adjusted once every two years. 
Minimum pensions are currently equal to 25 percent of average wages and 75 
percent of the minimum wage. In the past, they have been as low as 6 1 percent 
of minimum wages (in 1982) and as high as 91 percent of  minimum wages (in 
1987). The government also guarantees the minimum pension to those individ- 
uals who, having opted for a pension based on programmed withdrawals, out- 
live the program and exhaust their accumulated funds. 
Second, and as explained in the preceding subsection, the government guar- 
antees a minimum return on accumulated funds. If an AFP underperforms sig- 
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profitability  reserves-are  insufficient to bring the actual return to the mini- 
mum level, the government covers the difference. As pointed out, in this case 
the AFP is liquidated, and the participants transfer their funds to another insti- 
tution. Third, the government also guarantees pension payments (up to a limit) 
in case an insurance company goes bankrupt. 
In addition to its involvement in these areas, the Chilean government also 
makes pension payments to those individuals who, either by choice or because 
of their age, did not transfer to the new system. As is discussed in detail below, 
the  cost of paying  these  pensions  has been  significant,  exceeding, in  some 
years, 4 percent of GDP. 
From a policy point of view, the involvement of the government in providing 
and guaranteeing pensions means that, contrary to what has often been argued, 
the Chilean system relies on the “three  pillars”  recommended  by the World 
Bank in its report Averring the  Old Age Crisis (1994). There are, however, 
two main differences between the Chilean system and those in operation (or 
contemplated) in other countries: (a)  in Chile, the “public pillar” plays the role 
of a provider of last resort; (b)  in Chile, the obligatory capitalization pillar is 
privately  managed. The government  guarantees described above introduce a 
minimum sense of “solidarity”  into the system. They do this, however, at the 
cost of introducing significant elements of moral hazard. In particular, there is 
an incentive  for (lower-income) individuals to minimize their contributions 
and to obtain the minimum pension. An easy way to reduce this problem would 
be to establish some relation between guaranteed pension level and years of 
contributions. This means that, instead of a single guaranteed minimum pen- 
sion, there would be a guaranteed pension “band,” with those with, say, twenty 
years of contributions at the bottom of the band and those with thirty or more 
years of contributions at a higher level. 
1.4  Pensions under the New System 
One of the objectives of the Chilean pension reform was to increase the real 
value of pensions, especially for the poorer groups in the country (see Piiiera 
1988). Under the traditional system, retirement requirements and pension lev- 
els were determined in a discretionary fashion and, largely, responded to politi- 
cal influence.  Under the new system, the value of  pensions depends on the 
amount of funds accumulated. The new system established a retirement age of 
sixty-five years for men and of sixty years for women. As I discuss below, there 
is, however, the possibility  of early retirement. When individuals retire, they 
can choose between two systems: they can use the accumulated funds to buy 
an annuity from an insurance company, or they can choose to enroll in a “pro- 
grammed withdrawal”  scheme, where the accumulated  funds are drawn ac- 
cording to an actuarially determined schedule. Both these options have advan- 
tages and disadvantages. Under the programmed withdrawal alternative,  any 
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program, retirees can continue to transfer their balance across AFPs, thus tak- 
ing advantage of perceived (and expected) differentials in rates of return. Addi- 
tionally, if individuals outlive the program and their fund is used up, they get 
the minimum pension for the rest of their life. Annuities, on the other hand, 
assure retirees a steady and known income stream for the rest of their life. In 
the case of annuities, however, there are no inheritance provisions,  and fees 
have tended to be somewhat high. 
Recent data based on a sample of 4,064 individuals who have retired under 
the new system suggest that the average replacement rate has amounted to 78 
percent  (Baeza ValdCs  and Burger Torres  1  995).16 Interestingly enough, the 
highest (relative) pensions have been obtained by those individuals who have 
opted  for  early  retirement,  with  a  replacement  rate  of  82 percent  under 
programmed retirement. Baeza ValdCs and Burger Torres (1995) attribute this 
result to the fact that only those that have had rapid accumulation of funds- 
mostly by making voluntary contributions-can  in reality opt for early retire- 
ment. Disability pensions-which,  as explained earlier, are financed with a 3 
percent of wages insurance premium-have  also had high replacement rates, 
reaching 67 percent. Finally, survivors’ benefits have reached a 71 percent re- 
placement rate. These replacement rates are significantly higher than the aver- 
age for the old system-only  50 percent in 1980. 
The system also allows for early retirement. However, this becomes an op- 
tion only once the fund is high enough to produce a pension that covers at least 
70 percent of the contributor’s current salary. Those opting for early retirement 
can also choose between  programmed  withdrawals  and  annuities. By  1994, 
there were already 200,000 retirees receiving pensions under the new system. 
Of  these,  approximately  half  had  opted  for  annuities  and  half  for  pro- 
grammed withdrawal. 
There is also the possibility  of  lump sum withdrawals. To qualify for this 
option, two requirements must be met: (a)  the pension must have a replacement 
rate of  at least 70 percent; and (b)  the pension must be at least equal to  120 
percent of  the minimum pension. Although there are no exact figures on the 
percentage  of  individuals  who have  opted  for lump sum payments,  Baeza 
Valdts and Burger Torres (1995) discovered that 24 percent of the contributors 
in their sample had taken advantage of this option. They calculated that, when 
these payments are taken into account, the effective rate of replacement of the 
new system increases to 84 percent. 
The coexistence of old- and new-system retirees allows for a direct compari- 
son of  pensions under the pay-as-you-go  and capitalization systems. To De- 
cember  1994, average old age pensions under the capitalization system were 
42 percent higher than those under the pay-as-you-go  regime. In the case of 
16. These authors calculated the replacement rate on the basis of average real salary in the 120 
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disability, pensions under the new system were 61 percent higher than under 
the old one. 
Naturally, given the nature of Chile’s capitalization system, it is not possible 
to know exactly how future pensions will compare with those currently being 
paid. One can expect, however, two forces that will operate in opposite direc- 
tions in the future. On the one hand, a lower rate of return on the funds will 
reduce pension payments. On the other hand, if the steady-state rate of return is 
higher than 4 percent-the  return of the recognition bond, which represented a 
large percentage of the current retirees’ fund-we  could expect a positive ef- 
fect on pensions paid in the future. 
The actual rate of replacement has differed slightly between annuities and 
programmed withdrawals.  Baeza Valdks and Burger Torres (1995) found out 
that, for early retirement, the annuities scheme resulted in a replacement rate 
of  78 percent, while programmed withdrawal  resulted  in a replacement  rate 
of  83 percent.  For standard old age pensions,  however, annuities yielded  a 
replacement rate of 74 percent, while programmed withdrawal  resulted  in a 
replacement rate of 83 percent. 
An important (indirect) effect of the reform  is that it has encouraged the 
development of an active annuities market. Largely as a result of the pension 
reform, insurance companies’ assets as a percentage of GDP have increased by 
more than four times between  1985 and  1995. Annuities, however, are cur- 
rently very expensive, costing almost 4 percent of the value of the contract. 
This aspect of the system has generated important criticisms, including calls 
that, as a way of reducing cost, group purchases of annuities and greater regula- 
tion of the industry be allowed. 
1.5  Transitional Issues 
Dealing with the transition is one of the key policy questions in designing a 
pension reform program that replaces a pay-as-you-go  system with a capital- 
ization one. The transition poses three basic problems: (a)  The first problem is 
determining the transfer rule for workers. Which workers will join the new 
system, and which ones will stay with the old one? Will workers have a choice? 
(b)  The second is devising a method for crediting funds to those workers who 
transfer to the new system but who have already made contributions to the old 
system. (c)  The third  is financing  pension  payments  to old-system  retirees. 
Once contributions from active workers are pulled  out of the old system and 
channeled to the individual capitalization accounts, the old system becomes 
completely unfunded. 
The new Chilean pension  law (title 15, article 1) established that workers 
who joined the labor force before 3  1 December 1982 had five years to decide 
whether to join the new system. Those joining the labor force after that date 
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AFP of their choice. Since those who joined an AFP experienced an immediate 
increase in net take-home pay of  1 1 percent, the number of people transferring 
to the new regime was very high. By the end of  1982, more than a million 
workers, representing 36 percent of total employment, had already transferred 
to the new system. 
The government  dealt  with  past  contributions  of  transferees  by  issuing 
bonds that were deposited in their individual AFP accounts. The rationale for 
this  was  to  “recognize”  past  contributions-the  bonds  therefore  became 
known as recognition bonds-and  to provide the basis for the new retirement 
fund. These bonds yielded a 4 percent return in real terms, significantly below 
the ex post market return, and, until  1995, could not be traded in the second- 
ary market. 
In order to be eligible to receive a recognition bond, an individual must have 
made at least twelve monthly contributions to the old system during the previ- 
ous five years. The actual value of the recognition bond was calculated by using 
a rather complicated formula, consisting of the following steps: (a)  The aver- 
age annual base wage used to determine contributions made to the old system 
prior  to 30  June  1979 was  multiplied  by  0.8. (b) This number  was  then 
multiplied by  the ratio of total years of contributions to thirty-five (thirty-five 
years being the assumed number of working years for obtaining a “normal” 
pension). (c) The resulting number was multiplied by  10.35 for males and by 
11.36 for females. (d)  The number resulting  from this calculation  was then 
multiplied by a factor that varied according to the individual’s age and gender. 
For males, the factor varied between 1 and 1.11; for females, it varied between 
1 and 1.31. 
At this point, it is illustrative to make some actual calculations using this 
formula. Assume first the case of  a thirty-five-year-old  male whose average 
pensionable salary was U.S.$6,000 per year and who had been contributing to 
the old system for fifteen years. In this case, the value of the recognition bond 
to be deposited in his new AFP account would be U.S.$20,292.’’ Consider now 
the case of a forty-five-year-old female with an average pensionable salary of 
U.S.$6,000 and twenty-five years of contributions. Her recognition bond would 
amount to U.S.$40,896. Recognition bonds yield 4 percent in real terms and 
can be redeemed when the individual retires, dies, or becomes disabled. In the 
case of our hypothetical male worker, at age sixty-five the value of the recogni- 
tion bond  would be U.S.$70,000;  for our female participant, the recognition 
bond would have a value at retirement-recall  that women retire at sixty-of 
almost U.S.$74,000. An interesting calculation refers to the hypothetical value 
of the recognition bond for a sixty-five-year-old individual who has contributed 
for thirty-five years to the old system. In a way, this number would reflect the 
authorities’ implicit valuation of a lifetime of  contributions to the system. In 
17. Strictly speaking, this is only an approximation since the recognition bond was expressed 
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Table 1.5  Chile: Fiscal Effect of Social Security Reform; Its Effect on the 
Deficit of the Old System (% of GDP) 
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Sources; Ortuzar (1988) and IMF estimates. 
the case of  a male worker, this lifetime hypothetical recognition bond would 
be 9.198 times his average annual base salary. In  the case of a woman, the 
hypothetical value of the lifetime recognition bond would be 11.905 times the 
base salary if she had worked thirty-five years and 10.205 times the base salary 
if  she had worked thirty  years  (recall, once again, that women  retire at age 
sixty). 
From a fiscal point of view, the reform generated two major sources of pub- 
lic expenditures: (a)  the servicing and payment of the recognition bonds and 
(b)  the payment of retirees in the old system. Table 1.5 contains data on the 
fiscal costs of  the  transition. The first column  contains  information  on  the 
deficit (as percentage of  GDP) stemming from the government’s obligations 
toward “old” retirees. These include both those already retired when the reform 
was enacted and those who chose not to switch to the new system. Since most 
of the “cash” costs are related to pensions due to people who had already re- 
tired in 1981, these costs peaked rather early, in 1983, when they represented 
4.58 percent of GDP. In fact, given life expectancy in Chile, these costs start 
declining rather rapidly  after  1995. The second column in table 1.5 presents 
data on the cost of servicing and paying the recognition bonds (for details on 
the recognition bonds, see sec. 1.5 below) that were deposited in active work- 
ers’ retirement accounts. The time path of the recognition bonds’ costs is ex- 
plained by the country’s demographics. The pattern of projected retirements is 
such that the value of maturing bonds peaks in 2005. 
Chile has opted to finance these costs directly  out of general government 
revenues. In fact, one of the most attractive features of the Chilean reform is 
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to recognize sizable unfunded liabilities and provide for their payment. Some 
authors have argued that, since these costs are, indeed, quite large, Chilean- 
style reforms cannot be replicated in other countries (Mesa-Lago 1996). This, 
however, is not clear a priori and will depend on a number of economic, finan- 
cial, and especially political factors. Ultimately, the question is one of  costs 
and benefits. Is it worthwhile maintaining a compulsory, and in most cases 
largely inefficient, government-run pay-as-you-go system alongside a privately 
managed one, in order to avoid the fiscal costs of the transition?I8 
1.6  Effects on Capital Markets, Saving, and Labor Markets 
The Chilean pension reform has had important effects on the overall func- 
tioning of the economy. Perhaps one of the most important of these is that it 
has contributed to the phenomenal increase in the country’s saving rate, from 
less than 10 percent in 1986 to almost 29 percent in 1996. This effect has taken 
place mostly through an increase in public-sector saving-public  saving has 
increased from close to 0.1 percent of GDP in  1983 to more than 5 percent of 
GDP by 1993. A number of researchers have established that increasing public- 
sector saving represents the most effective way of increasing aggregate saving. 
In general, higher public saving unleashes a virtuous circle, where higher sav- 
ing generates higher growth and higher growth (in turn) results in higher pri- 
vate  saving  (Edwards  1996). Whether  the Chilean reform  has  actually  in- 
creased private saving directly is still somewhat of an open question. Although 
cross-country regression analyses suggest that pension reform affects private 
saving, there still are no definitive studies of the Chilean case.” Haindl (1996), 
however, has recently attempted to estimate econometrically the effects of the 
reform on private-sector saving. Using an approach based on the inclusion of 
a series of dummy variables in a time-series analysis of  the determinants of 
saving, he concludes that the reform indeed contributed to the increase in sav- 
ing.?O In a more ambitious attempt, Morande (1996) uses modern time-series 
analysis to estimate an error-correction model of  saving for Chile. He con- 
cludes that there is preliminary evidence supporting the notion that the reform 
of the pension system encouraged private-sector saving. Finally, Bosworth and 
Marfan (1994) have argued that the contribution of the pension reform to the 
increase in saving bordered 3 percent of GDP. 
Pension funds are the largest institutional investors in  the Chilean capital 
market, with assets exceeding 40 percent of GDP, as compared to 0.9 percent 
in  1981. The asset composition of pension funds is described in table 1.6.  As 
discussed above, the performance of AFP portfolios has been impressive in 
18. This is the avenue chosen by  some Latin American countries, such as Argentina. 
19. On cross-country studies of saving and social security, see, e.g., Feldstein (1980) and Ed- 
20. Haindl’s (1996) analysis, however, is subject to a number of  shortcomings, including the 
wards (1996). 
presence of  a serious simultaneity bias. Table 1.6  Chile: Pension Fund Assets per Financial Instruments (% as of December of each year) 
Time Deposits,  Credit Notes, 
Financial  Financial  Corporate  Finns  Investment  Foreign 
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.'As of May  1993, AFF's  began to invest in foreign instruments. 
hNovember 1995. 
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Table 1.7  Chile: Annual Real Rates of Return on the Financial System and on 
Individual Pension Accounts,  1981-90  (%) 
Returns to 


































Source: IMF, based on data provided by Chilean authorities. 
“For  the average assessable income. These returns are lower than the average for the AFPs (re- 
ported in table I.  I) owing to the existence of commissions for fees paid by asset holders. 
terms of real rates of return, and, as shown in table 1.7,  the returns to individual 
pension accounts have been higher (on average) than for the financial system 
as a whole. The massive amount of funds that AFPs control has helped create 
a dynamic and modern capital market. What is perhaps more important, how- 
ever, is that it has allowed private firms to rely on long-term financing for their 
investment  projects.  This has been  particularly  important  for the  privatized 
utilities. Moreover, Chile’s new and ambitious (privately funded) infrastructure 
program will be possible only if there is long-term financing available, of the 
type the AFPs are able of providing. 
The pension reform has also had an important effect on the functioning of 
the labor market. First, by reducing the total rate of payroll taxes, it has reduced 
the cost of labor and, thus, has encouraged job creation. Second, by relying on 
a capitalization  system, it has greatly reduced-if  not eliminated-the  labor 
tax component of the retirement  system. Currently, (most) workers see their 
contributions as a deferred compensation rather than as a tax. A key question, 
however, is whether there is still an element of taxation involved in the system. 
This will depend on a number of factors, including the rate of return on the 
funds, the perceived  future pension  income, the magnitude  of  management 
fees, the degree of risk aversion, and the rate of discount of workers. Diamond 
and Valdks-Prieto (1994) have argued that, although it is likely that the new 
system still retains some implicit tax, this is substantially lower than in the old 
system.?’  Cox-Edwards (1992) has also argued that the Chilean pension reform 
21. A modern and  well-functioning labor market has  been  an  important element of  Chile’s 
economic success. It has allowed for rapid job creation and has resulted in the reduction of a rate 
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system has resulted in a significant reduction in effective taxes on labor. She 
has argued that this has contributed to the surge in employment creation in 
Chile as well as to the rapid increase in (average) real wages since 1985. 
1.7  Concluding Remarks 
The Chilean pension reform program has been  a pioneer in the world.  It 
has successfully replaced an inefficient, unfair, insolvent pay-as-you-go system 
with a (reasonably) well-functioning privately managed system. Until now, the 
rates of return of the new system, as well as the pensions being paid out, have 
been very high. This trend, however, is likely to change in the years to come 
as Chile’s rates of return begin to converge toward world levels. In fact, during 
the  last eighteen months (1995 and the  first half of  1996), the  system as a 
whole has experienced negative returns. An interesting issue is how the system 
will react to this new state of affairs. The most likely scenario, in my opinion, 
is one where some of the current shortcomings of the system-including  the 
limitation for multiple funds and the distortionary incentives generated by the 
government-will  be addressed by the authorities. It is not unlikely, then, that 
the  Chilean  system will  continue  to evolve,  providing  fresh lessons  in  the 
future. 
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Comment  Stephen P. Zeldes 
Before the last presidential election, President Clinton was interviewed on tele- 
vision by Tom Brokaw. One of the topics discussed was social security reform, 
and Brokaw asked the president what he thought about the option of privatizing 
Social Security. Surprisingly, the president answered the question. He said that 
he was skeptical about mandatory privatization but thought that optional priva- 
tization merited  study. He added, “But before  we do something  that totally 
changes something that’s worked rather well, there ought to be a way to test it 
in kind  of  a laboratory  sense. And I would  favor looking  at it very closely 
with some evidence before we made a big, sweeping decision” (“Transcript of 
Interview”  1996). 
Sebastian Edwards provides an excellent description of the partial privatiza- 
tion of social security that was put into place in Chile in 1980 and continues 
today. In a very clear and careful way, the paper describes the economic envi- 
ronment prior to privatization, the transition plan, the mechanics of the current 
system, and the economic effects of changing systems. The focus of my discus- 
sion will be on what we can learn from the Chilean experience about priva- 
tizing social security elsewhere in the world and in particular  in the United 
States. Specifically, does this provide us with what Clinton and many others 
want-“a  way to test [privatization] in . . . a laboratory sense”? 
There are a number  of  people, including Jod Piiiera,  the “father” of  the 
Chilean reform, who claim that it does provide a test and that it has been wildly 
successful. The clear implication is that the United States should try to repli- 
cate the Chilean reforms. 
This paper cries out for a sequel that examines whether this is true. In other 
words, now that we know what went on in Chile, what can we learn from Chile 
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Table lC.l  Comparing the Initial Situations in Chile and the United States 
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Large federal budget surplus? 
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about privatizing social security in the United States?' While I cannot answer 
that question, I do have some suggestions as to how it might be approached. 
First, to draw implications about the United States from Chile, it is important 
that the structures of  the economies and the initial conditions be similar. To 
what extent is this true? Second, if  the economies and initial conditions are 
similar, then this suggests that what worked in Chile might very well work in 
the United States. Therefore, we need to ask what worked in Chile and what 
did not. This will help us determine whether privatization  would be a good 
thing for the United States and, if so, which aspects of the Chilean program 
should be kept, which dropped, and which modified. 
Table lC.l compares the initial situations in Chile in 1980 and in the United 
States today. The key similarities are the presence of an unfunded, pay-as-you- 
go government-administered defined-benefit plan and past and forecasted fu- 
ture declines in the ratio of  workers  to beneficiaries.  There is some lack of 
uniformity in social security benefit formulas across households in the United 
States, but significantly less so than was the case in Chile. Major differences 
are that the Chilean system was regressive, with high-income households get- 
ting a better deal than low-income households, while the reverse is true in the 
United States.? Chile had very thin capital markets, while the United States has 
one of the best-developed  capital markets  in the world. Chile began with a 
large federal budget surplus, while the United States is running a budget defi- 
cit. Finally, the Chilean reform was instituted by  a military government, a fea- 
ture not present in the United States. 
1.  For work along these lines, see, e.g., Diamond (1994). 
2.  However, the tendency of high-income households to live longer than  low-income house- 
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The  key  aspects  of  the  new  Chilean  system  are  the  following: 
(1) Recognition bonds were issued to cover the implicit liabilities, with interest 
and principal financed out of general revenues. (2) Mandatory  contributions 
are set equal to 10 percent  of wages. (3) Self-employed workers are not re- 
quired to participate. (4) There are a small number of regulated AFPs with one 
fund each; portfolio choices available to households are very limited. (5)  There 
is a regulated  minimum and maximum  rate of return (based on the average 
return  across all AFPs),  and there are restrictions  on the assets held by  the 
AFPs. (6) Unlimited switching between AFPs is allowed. (7) The government 
guarantees a minimum pension. (8) Individuals have a choice between annuiti- 
zation and controlled withdrawals on retirement. 
Privatization of the public pension system in Chile has been deemed a large 
success. Why is this? First, individuals have received high ex post returns on 
the system. Second, it has given people a greater sense of security, by reducing 
political risks about future benefits. Third, the system is more uniform and thus 
considered  more progressive and more fair. Fourth, it has been followed by 
higher economic growth, higher government  and national saving, and lower 
unemployment. 
Which of these benefits are real ones for Chile?3 Although I do not have all 
the answers, I raise the following questions. Regarding the first, how much of 
the high ex post return was due to the reform, how much to other economic 
changes, how much to luck, and how much to the fact that the transition costs 
were financed out of general revenue rather than from within social security 
(thus making returns  appear higher  than they  were)?  Regarding  the fourth, 
how can we better estimate the quantitative effects of public pension reform? 
Although  the paper describes  the positive economic  developments  that  oc- 
curred after 1980, it is unfortunately very difficult to disentangle the effects of 
social security reform from those of the other very large reforms that occurred 
simultaneously. For example, Edwards begins by describing the extensive pri- 
vatization of government-owned businesses and the reduction of import tariffs 
and government controls that occurred at about the same time as the public 
pension reform. How are we to tell what the economic effects would have been 
if only the pension reform had been undertaken (or if the other changes had 
occurred without pension reform)? 
What of the disadvantages of the Chilean reform (relative to the previous 
system)? The primary  one seems to be  high  (but declining)  administrative 
costs. 
Which of  these  advantages  and disadvantages  would be  relevant  for the 
United States? Again, this is a topic that requires substantial additional work, 
but here is some speculation. As in Chile, the reduction in political risk would 
likely be substantial. It is likely that higher national saving would occur only 
if there were an increase in taxes (to pay interest and possibly repay principal 
3. The following is based in part on Mitchell and Zeldes (1996). 60  Sebastian Edwards 
on the “recognition bonds”) or a cut in benefits or government spending. Labor 
supply distortions would be reduced  (although less than in Chile because of 
the initial conditions), and, unlike in Chile, this would lead to a less progressive 
system with less earnings insurance. The high degree of success of the private 
annuity markets in Chile might very well carry over to the United States. Be- 
cause stock and bond markets are already very extensive and deep, however, 
there would be minimal expansion or deepening of these markets. The high 
administrative costs would likely carry over to the United States, although it is 
unlikely that they would be as high as in Chile since in the United States mar- 
kets  are many  times  larger  and mutual  funds already  have extensive expe- 
rience. 
Finally, there are some things that we cannot learn from Chile, including 
one of the questions most frequently raised about privatization in the United 
States. How would individuals, especially currently unsophisticated investors, 
respond to increased portfolio choice? Would they appreciate the added flexi- 
bility, and would they make “wise” choices? Having been denied genuine port- 
folio choice in their individual accounts, Chileans have not been given the op- 
portunity to provide us with evidence on this crucial question. This is because 
all AFPs in Chile must invest in essentially the same portfolio or risk running 
afoul of rate-of-return restrictions and asset ceilings set by law. 
Overall, this paper is very well done and will be a terrific resource for those 
working in the area of social security reform. I hope that there is a sequel that 
explores in detail what the Chilean experience can teach us about the effects 
of privatizing the U.S. social security system. 
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Discussion Summary  Jeffrey Liebman and Andrew Samwick 
The discussion  began  with one participant  claiming that  a country’s budget 
position at the time of the privatization is not relevant to whether the privatiza- 
tion will increase national  saving. He said that the benefits of the increased 
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saving exist regardless  of whether the budget  is in surplus or deficit.  It was 
further added that the saving response might be even larger if the budget was 
in deficit because politicians might be tempted to spend surpluses to achieve 
political rather than economic objectives. The author agreed  with the claim 
that Chile’s surpluses were political liabilities and described the way in which 
the government actually had to hide them from the military during Chile’s tran- 
sition. It was also pointed out that a budget surplus might facilitate the transi- 
tion in a country like Chile, which was still in the process of a macroeconomic 
stabilization plan to reduce inflation. In addition to providing credibility, the 
budget  surplus might  allow the privatization to occur without  a subsequent 
increase in taxes that might cause the privatization to be derailed once under 
way. 
The discussion then turned to characteristics of  the Chilean system of AFPs 
that manage the pension accounts. Many people remarked that the system of 
regulations that restricts participants to one account, AFPs to one fund, funds 
to a limited set of investment vehicles, and annual returns to lie within a very 
narrow  band might encourage herding by AFP managers. Concern was then 
expressed regarding the effect of switching AFPs on administrative costs, espe- 
cially since the AFPs all seem to invest in very similar portfolios yet devote 
substantial  resources  to  marketing  their  funds. When  asked  why  workers 
switch between AFPs given the similarity of returns, the author explained that 
the plans offer free toasters, green stamps, and sneakers to people who switch 
to their plan. 
Another  distinctive  feature  of  the  Chilean reform  was  the  high  returns 
achieved by the AFPs in the early years and the lower and even negative returns 
in recent years. The author acknowledged that much of the high return in the 
early years came from the holdings of two public utility companies that under- 
took the huge investment in infrastructure that occurred as part of Chile’s over- 
all stabilization  policy. The high returns  on these  long-term  bonds  will not 
continue indefinitely. There has been no public outcry about the negative re- 
turns yet, but participants pointed out the risk of political pressure to “top off” 
returns in bad years. Proposals have been  made to allow a broader  range of 
investment  options,  including  global  funds  that  had  previously  been  pro- 
scribed, to keep returns high. 
The effects of Chile’s history of high inflation were also acknowledged to 
have played a role in the privatization. High inflation eroded the value of the 
previous systems’ funds. The low expectations that workers had for their future 
benefits may have made privatization an easier policy to accept. Chile is now 
a completely indexed country, and the new system was therefore able to pro- 
vide real annuities and indexed benefit levels. 
Concerns were also raised about potential leakages from the system leading 
to poverty in old age. For example, the self-employed are not required to partic- 
ipate in the system. Although some are wealthy, the welfare system provides 
minimal benefits,  equal to approximately  40 percent of the minimum wage. 62  Sebastian Edwards 
About 99 percent of the population has made at least one monthly contribution 
to an AFP. However, owing to the fact that some people are out of the labor 
force, unemployed, or self-employed, only 58 percent are actively contributing. 
The author noted that, because of this discrepancy, the rate of coverage is not 
much higher under the new system than it was under the old. Although poverty 
has been declining among the elderly lately, this likely has been due to high 
rates of overall economic growth. 
The discussion ended by acknowledging the beneficial effect of the priva- 
tization on capital markets in Chile. Preliminary studies on the effect of  the 
privatization on saving seem to suggest that private saving rose slightly while 
national saving increased substantially. Additionally, the market for long-term 
corporate securities has developed in large part to meet the demands of  the 
AFPs. 